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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

#### DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

#### International Financial Situation Report #59 18 December 1986

## Summary Brazil is encountering serious financial difficulties. Soaring domestic demand for goods has lowered exports, foreign investment is at a 15-year low, and capital flight has accelerated. according to US Embassy. The Sarney administration has expressed deep concern about this situation particularly about Brazil's dwindling cash reserves down from \$7.8 billion early in the year to as low as \$3-4 billion at the 25X1 beginning of December. Brazil is working toward overcoming its difficulties by seeking improved relations with Paris Club official creditors. Even after obtaining a Paris Club rescheduling, we believe Brazil's financial squeeze will not ease appreciably for several months. In other developments: 25X1 Mexico's commercial bankers have received commitments totaling 93 percent of the 0 \$7.7 billion new money package. Argentina is continuing negotiations with the IMF for a \$1.55 billion combined standby 0 arrangement/compensatory financing facility. We expect them to reach an agreement by early next year. Market response to the Soviet Vneshtorgbank's latest \$300 million syndicated loan is 0 sluggish, possibly resulting in embarrassment for the Soviets and indicating tha 25X1 future loans will have to be priced more attractively. Indonesia may be forced to "readjust" its debt payments early next year 0 Foreign bankers are concerned by Jakarta's 25X1 unwillingness to begin negotiations for a \$3-4 billion IMF standby program. 25X1 While Egypt continues informal talks with the Paris Club and the IMF, commercial 0 credit continues to contract and the Central Bank is low on cash reserves. 25X1 25X1 NOTE: REPORT #60 WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 15 JANUARY 1987 This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are welcome and may be addressed to the Situation Report Coordinator 25X1 GI M 86-20287C 25X1 25X1

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## KEY ISSUE

# Brazil: Deteriorating Financial Position

A sharp decline in Brazil's trade surplus from a monthly average of \$1 billion during January-September to only slightly over \$200 million in October and November threatens to draw the country into its first foreign exchange crisis since 1983. Exports receipts have slumped badly because, according to the US Embassy, soaring domestic demand has been diverting consumer goods from export markets and rumors of a major devaluation also have caused exporters to withhold sales. Moreover, foreign investment is at a 15-year low, new borrowing has virtually stopped, and capital flight has accelerated, according to the US Embassy in Brasilia. The Sarney administration has expressed deep concern about Brazil's dwindling cash reserves—  down from \$7.8 billion early in the year to as low as \$3-4 billion at the beginning of December.
So far, the government has taken only limited steps to shore up its payments position. It implemented substantial price adjustments on 21 November to dampen domestic demand but strong public protests, notably the 12 December general strike, make important follow-up measures unlikely within the next several weeks. Although Brasilia has instituted daily mini-devaluations of the Cruzado to boost exports, the US Embassy reports that the private sector is not satisfied and continues to wait for a much larger devaluation. The government has temporarily suspended import licenses through administrative delays and government foreign exchange transactions under the Central Bank  Brazil also is working toward overcoming its debt difficulties by seeking improved relations with Paris Club officials.
Paris Club issue would pave the way for a reopening of OECD government export credits
necessary to ease cash stringencies. It would also pave the way for resumption of negotiations with commercial bank creditors.
Despite reconciliation with official creditors, we believe that Brazil's financial squeeze will not ease appreciably for several months.

will make negotiation rescheduling agreemen	problems and the prospect of possible arrearages almost certainly as early next year with creditor banks for a multiyear debted more difficult and contentious.  Sarney administration probably will feel compelled by domestic
political pressures to those recently won by debt repayment record	demand lower interest spreads and better repayment terms than Mexico because Brazil has a better economic performance and Indeed, the press reported that Finance Minister Funaro stressed New York that Brazil henceforth will have to service its debt at
much lower cost, signa	ling a tougher Brazilian negotiating stand.
stance by bankers has Brazilians to opt for a	We believe that an unyielding hardline the potential to erupt into outright confrontation, leading the moratorium on debt repayments next year.
	DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES
Mexico  Commitments from the commercial loss as a second c	om international bankers so far represent 93 percent of the \$7.7
Commitments from	om international bankers so far represent 93 percent of the \$7.7 n package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to
Commitments from billion commercial load complete the deal.  Mexican negotial international bankers covered by the governous rescheduling, a number principal repayments principal repayments principal repayments.	tors expect to reach a preliminary agreement soon with on terms for restructuring \$11.7 billion in private-sector debt ment foreign exchange risk program (FICORCA). Without the of firms included in the plan probably could not continue making
Mexican negotial international bankers covered by the government repayments in the smaller banks may decovered to resist Mexican proposition.	tors expect to reach a preliminary agreement soon with on terms for restructuring \$11.7 billion in private-sector debt ment foreign exchange risk program (FICORCA). Without the of firms included in the plan probably could not continue making presently set to rise from \$200 million this year to \$3 billion in major banks probably will agree to rescheduling payments, but ide to write off loans or swap debt for equity. Bankers are likely osals requiring them to lend repayments to private enterprises or account at the Bank of Mexico given their gloomy assessment of
Mexican negotial international bankers covered by the government rescheduling, a number principal repayments princ	tors expect to reach a preliminary agreement soon with on terms for restructuring \$11.7 billion in private-sector debt ment foreign exchange risk program (FICORCA). Without the of firms included in the plan probably could not continue making presently set to rise from \$200 million this year to \$3 billion in major banks probably will agree to rescheduling payments, but ide to write off loans or swap debt for equity. Bankers are likely osals requiring them to lend repayments to private enterprises or account at the Bank of Mexico given their gloomy assessment of
Mexican negotial international bankers covered by the govern rescheduling, a number principal repayments principal repayments principal repayments maller banks may decept to resist Mexican properties the funds in an Mexico's economic prosentations contested by arrangement/confficials are concerned.	om international bankers so far represent 93 percent of the \$7.7 in package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to package and Mexico Gity expects it will take until January to the package and Mexico Gity expects it will take until January to mean terms for restructuring \$11.7 billion in private-sector debt in private expects. The package and Mexico Gity expects in package and Mexico Gity expects it will take until January to mean terms for restructuring \$11.7 billion in private-sector debt in private-sector debt in private-sector debt in private enterprises or account at the Bank of Mexico Given their gloomy assessment of pects.  In package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico Gity expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico Gity expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and Mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and mexico City expects it will take until January to mean terms of the package and mexico City expects of the package and

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because of market anxiety over the discussions, according to the US Embassy. Negotiators are in frequent contact, however, and we expect them to reach an agreement by early next year. President Alfonsin's recently unveiled public-sector reform initiatives almost surely were designed to demonstrate to the IMF that Argentina is ready to address some of the underlying causes of its fiscal deficit. The reform includes the creation of a holding company for major state-owned enterprises—headed by a senior private-sector executive—to speed the introduction of efficiency-enhancing measures, and a cutback in executive-branch employment through a voluntary retirement program.	25X1
Argentine and Dutch negotiators have reached a preliminary agreement on resolving a bilateral debt associated with a Dutch-built pipeline, according to the US Embassy. Under the agreement, the Dutch company Cogasco will transfer ownership of the pipeline to the Argentine state gas company. In return, Buenos Aires will cancel Cogasco's debt and compensate the company for future earnings through the balance of the original contract period. The Dutch will finance the bulk of the \$1.1 billion package deal, the US Embassy reports. An agreement would clear a longstanding stumbingblock to Paris Club rescheduling of Argentine 1986-87 bilateral debt.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Latin America	
In Latin America, Venezuela and its creditor banks are grappling with how to reschedule the debtor's private-sector debts, while Ecuador's IMF disbursement has been delayed, but Panama and the World Bank have reached a compromise, making a \$50 million disbursement possible this year.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Venezuela	
President Lusinchi's efforts to achieve consensus before making difficult economic policy decisions helped delay his promised "turn of the rudder" by one month. When he announced his economic adjustments on 6 December, he tacitly admitted that his government still had not arrived at a comprehensive set of measures. The adjustments so far, including a major devaluation, pave the way for tighter foreign exchange controls. Lusinchi also announced minor financial incentives for certain sectors of basic industry. To make the economic package palatable, he retained price controls on basic consumer	1
goods and granted a 25-percent increase in the minimum wage to organized labor.	25X1 25X1
The new plan to handle the private-sector debt calls for \$5.5 billion of the \$7.8 billion private-sector debt to be repaid within eight and a half years.	25X1
Although the new private and a life in the second s	
Although the new private-sector debt scheme has been imposed rather than negotiated with foreign creditors, the US Embassy reports representatives of US banks in Caracas think the scheme will be acceptable to most foreign creditors. Local businessmen, however, have reacted negatively to the scheme. According to press and Embassy reports, they fear that the increased costs will bankrupt some companies. In addition, they anticipate debt servicing disruptions and uncertainty in the short term.	25X1 

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## Ecuador

Beuteor	
The IMF has delayed disbursement of an \$18 million tranche to Ecuador, thus adding to current economic concerns caused by low oil revenues. According to US Embassy reporting, Ecuador has failed to meet its standby targets on international reserves and domestic credit, and has increased government spending to twice the level specified in the August agreement. The increase in government expenditures will raise the public-sector deficit to 5 percent of the GDP this year, according to IMF estimates, substantially over the target of 2.5 percent. Government officials have been meeting this month with IMF representatives to discuss target revisions that will allow disbursement of funds under the accord, but a rescheduling is unlikely before the end of 1986, according to the US Embassy.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Meanwhile, Ecuador has announced plans to seek a rescheduling of \$5 billion in foreign commercial bank debt early next year, in response to growing external obligations.  In addition, the Central Bank has approved debt-equity swaps as a mechanism to reduce as much as \$1.3 billion in private-sector foreign debt assumed by the government in 1983. According to US Embassy reporting, the debt-equity swaps have the advantage of reducing Ecuador's debt service at no cost to the government and may facilitate privatization of state	25X1
enterprises.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Panama	
The World Bank and Panama have reached a compromise that allows a disbursement of half of the \$100 million second structural adjustment loan (SAL), even though the reform of the politically sensitive social security reform system will not be passed this year. According to the US Embassy, the World Bank is pleased with the progress Panama made earlier this year on economic adjustments, and has agreed to disburse the \$50 million first tranche based largely on Panama's demonstration of "good will" to move ahead on social security reforms. But the expected prompt cabinet approval of the legislation, unveiled 25 November, was delayed when the major political parties and the social security board of directors rejected the package outright. These groups — as well as Defense Chief Noriega — apparently have become concerned the prospect of heavy	
criticism from business, professional, and labor groups.	25X1
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USSR	
USSR	
Following its October market entry, final syndication of Vneshtorgbank's \$300 million loan was announced, with almost exclusively European banks participating.	25 <b>X</b> 1
According to US Embassy reporting, Western bankers have indicated that Banque Nationale de Paris is having trouble selling down the loan reflecting extremely low interest rate spread of 0.125 of a percentage point above LIBOR and the current saturation of the secondary market. Although these problems are of a technical	
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nature, the reluctance of banks to participate could be embarassing for the Soviets and may mean that future loans will have to be priced more attractively.	25 <b>X</b> 1
In the future, the Soviet Union can be expected to broaden the scope of financial instruments it employs. By diversifying its sources and methods of borrowing, Moscow can expect to gain flexibility and leverage in international markets and reduce the costs of borrowing.	25 <b>X</b> 1
To venture into the bond or instrument market, however, Moscow must be willing to forego control over ownership of its obligations — something it has not been willing to do in the past. Moreover, the	
Soviets will need to develop the market sophistication necessary to trade successfully in these instruments.  Asia	25 <b>X</b> 1
Among Asian countries, Indonesia may be forced to "readjust" its debt payments early next year, Malaysia's banking system is feared to be moving toward insolvency, and	25X1
the Philippines is scheduled to resume negotiations with commercial banks in January.  Indonesia	25X1
While the government publicly denys rumors that Jakarta will reschedule its external debt Indonesia may be forced to "readjust" its debt after the first quarter 1987  Meanwhile, Indonesia will draw down another \$1 billion on existing commercial lines of credit, dip into its \$10 billion in foreign reserves, and seek \$2 billion or more from the World Bank and the Japanese Exim Bank to meet its 1987 net financing requirements—estimated at \$4 billion by one international bank. The Indonesians may also seek a	25X1
estimated at \$4 billion by one international bank. The Indonesians may also seek a compensatory financing facility from the IMF	25 <b>X</b> 1
Nevertheless, foreign creditors are concerned by Jakarta's reluctance to begin negotiations for a \$3-4 billion IMF standby program.	25X1
The market for Indonesian debt is growing rapidly as Western banks become increasingly concerned about Jakarta's financial outlook. Loans currently being swapped for 83-85 cents on the dollar, for example, could soon be trading at 70-75 cents per dollar according to a reliable source.	25X1
Malaysia	
Malaysia's foreign bank creditors believe that without swift government intervention, a number of major Malaysian banks could become insolvent by mid-1987. By the end of the first quarter 1987, for example,  no principal or interest will have been paid in 18 months on over 25 percent of Malaysian bank loans. These loans were made primarily to exporting companies, which	25X1 25X1
have been hard hit by low oil and other commodity prices.	25 <b>X</b> 1
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reduce the governme	the government does not appear serious in its efforts to nt budget deficit and to devalue the ringgit. Instead, Mahathir's
financial advisors app economy in 1987. F revenues to decline exposure next year.	ear to be hoping for a rebound in commodity prices to bolster the for their part, many international banks — which expect exports to 10 percent in 1987 — may consider decreasing their loan on the other hand, Japanese banks probably will remain involved in heir loan efforts in the Pacific rim, despite their concern over the
<b>Philippines</b>	
out an agreed position differences on a new officials. According month moratorium on billion revolving trade months. In what Philip a clause stipulating the negotiations with Philip	bank advisory committee (BAC) met on 11 December to hammer on. The BAC members now believe they have narrowed their egotiating stance sufficiently to resume talks with Philippine to press reports, the BAC members have granted Manila a three-debts that mature starting 1 January, and agreed to extend the \$3 facility — originally due to expire at the end of the year — for six appine officials view as a significant step, the moratorium contains nat the final terms will be retroactive to 1 January 1987. Formal appine officials could begin in early January. The Philippines is also egotiations with its Paris Club creditors in January.
Middle East	st, Egypt continues informal talks with the Paris Club and the IMF
and Morocco's \$1.5 bil	lion rescheduling package is nearly complete.
Egypt	
executive directors at program, according to underestimating the arrangement, however IMF acceptance of its setting the stage for elements of the stand criteria — are still a interest rate hikes, ear informal talks on Ca officials tomorrow of	Is appear satisfied with the support they received from key IMF to a 4 December Fund discussion of the country's economic reform to US Embassy reports. Cairo may be distance that remains before Fund approval of a standby control of the country's economic reform measures as the most that is politically possible for Egypt, a speedy Fund agreement on a standby arrangement. Critically possible for Egypt, a speedy Fund agreement on a standby arrangement. Critically possible for Egypt, a speedy Fund agreement on economic performance head, however, and the details of exchange rate unification and cha potential sticking point, remain to be worked out. Meanwhile, iro's problems continue with a Paris Club discussion with IMF Egypt's financial situation, and a meeting of key IMF Executive the subject next week.
Meanwhile,	US Embassy contacts report the Egyptian central ke, and the Fund believes that Cairo — prior to the Kuwaiti aid —

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although European countries' export credit agencies officially remain on cover for Egypt,	25 <b>X</b> 1

Although European countries' export credit agencies officially remain on cover for Egypt, our Embassy reports almost all of them have gone off cover unofficially.

Morocco

Morocco and its commercial bank advisory committee reached agreement in principle last week on a \$1.5 billion debt rescheduling package.

both sides settled on a rate of 1.19 points above LIBOR, for most of the debts, but Rabat will pay 1.63 points above LIBOR on debts that had been rescheduled once before. The rescheduling terms will now be telexed to all of Morocco's bank creditors for approval. With agreement in principle

#### Africa

#### Nigeria

arrangement for Morocco.

The IMF last week approved in principle for 30 days a \$790 million standby agreement for Nigeria, according to US officials. President Babangida has claimed, however, that Lagos will not actually draw the money available under the standby because of domestic opposition. Final approval remains pending until a "critical mass" of Nigeria's commercial lenders — probably 90 percent — agree to participate in the \$4 billion debt rescheduling and \$320 million new money package approved to by the London Club steering committee last month. More than half of the banks reportedly have signed on already, but the process may not conclude before yearend. The US Embassy reports that the Paris Club of official creditors concluded a debt rescheduling this week, which will become effective upon final approval of the IMF accord. Meanwhile, the World Bank last month provided its first disbursement from a \$450 million loan to help fund Nigeria's second-tier foreign exchange market.

reached on the bank rescheduling, the IMF this week approved a \$275 million standby

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### FINANCIAL BRIEFS

### International

An African Development Bank (AFDB) committee reached agreement on terms and conditions for a 200 percent (\$9 billion) fourth general capital increase (GCI) covering the period 1987-91 to deal with the chronic problem of subscription arrears, voting power will now be tied to paid-in capital AFDB executive board will consider the GCI proposal 18 December.  Thirty-one donor countries agreed to a \$12.4 billion replenishment of the International Development Association Japan's shareholding in World Bank will increase by 1.5 percent; Italy and the Netherlands by 0.32 percent as part of the agreement sub-Saharan Africa slated to receive 45 to 50 percent of future IDA loans.	25 25
Paris Club official creditors scheduled to meet during week of 19 January countries tentatively on agenda include Zambia, Morocco, Gabon, the Philippines, and	25
possibly Brazil and Poland.	25
Americas	
Bolivia has fully complied with the targets of its IMF standby agreement its fiscal deficit this year will probably be 3.7 percent of GDP, compared with 14 percent in 1985 Fund officials predict that Bolivia will qualify for a \$60 million compensatory financing facility in 1987 in addition to the \$40 million it is already scheduled to receive later this year.	25
Colombia seeking \$400 million in rural development loans from World Bank to undercut insurgency recently received \$171 million from World Bank for electric power system, wants additional \$800 million from Inter-American Development Bank and commercial banks for same project.	2
Cuba missed 30 November deadline for payments due under 1986 Paris Club agreement not likely to pay soon banks again refused Havana's request for \$350 million to settle overdue short-term commercial debts, countering with an offer of about \$65 million to cover interest due in 1986.	2:
World Bank and IMF Boards agreed that <b>Dominica</b> would be the test case for the new joint Structural Adjustment Facility approved the first year of the three-year program in late November makes nearly \$1 million of a total \$2.25 million loan available for immediate disbursement.	2
	2

, 0	otiate exact program detailsstumbling blocks remain arrears, calls for government spending.
trading partne	ua establishing a national foreign trade bankresponding to complaints of ers that Central Bank actions make it difficult to conduct normal trading hope to increase exports to Western Europe by streamlining financial
more expe financial rate	s tinkered with exchange rates to counter falling reserves and weak exports ort and import transactions shifted from official rate to a 25 percent higher both exchange rates will be devalued 2.2 percent monthly beginning in fast enough to compensate for inflation.
<b>Europe</b>	
expected 1986	illion in payment arrears Warsaw claims payment difficulties because of trade surplus of only about \$1 billion—\$500 million less than planned to offer new money due to poor economic prospects.
Hungary pillion expecte Japanese a kikely to sho	varranging \$200 million loan to help cover current account deficit of \$1 ed for 1986 priced at 0.25 of a percentage point over LIBOR for 8 years. appetite for Hungarian paper may have bid down price US banks not by much interest because of Hungary's worsening external payments
Hungary Dillion expects Japanese a Likely to sho Situation.	arranging \$200 million loan to help cover current account deficit of \$1 ed for 1986 priced at 0.25 of a percentage point over LIBOR for 8 years. appetite for Hungarian paper may have bid down price US banks not
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